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ABSTRACT
Firms are driving forces of economic and social development; 
therefore it is important to understand what is their primary goal or 
purpose. The aim of the paper is twofold. First, the paper presents 
baseline theoretical concepts on the firms’ purposes. Secondly, the 
paper presents the results of the empirical study in Slovenia with 
which we tried to determine how firms’ purposes are perceived by 
their managers and how they see their responsibility to owners 
and other stakeholders. The empirical study was based on a survey 
that was sent to the management of 1400 Slovenian medium-
sized and big companies, of which about one third responded. The 
survey questionnaire was pre-tested through interviewing five top 
managers in five Slovenian firms with different ownership structure. 
On the basis of the empirical study it is possible to conclude that, on 
average, Slovenian firms put the interests of all stakeholders before 
the interests of only shareholders. So it seems that the majority of 
managers follow the stakeholder approach in the governance model.
1. Introduction
What is the purpose of a firm? In whose interests is it governed? To whom is the purpose 
of a firm subordinated? All of these questions, despite voluminous literature (Coffee, 1998; 
Collins & Porras, 1994; Gamble & Kelly, 2001; Jensen, 2001; Rose & Mejer, 2003; Senge, 
2000) still remain at least partly unanswered. Although there are several studies that try 
to solve these questions for modern economies, there is a lack of empirical findings for 
post-transitional economies, despite the fact that firms’ functioning, operations and perfor-
mance are important for their social and economic development. These modern economies 
have undergone a transition from state property or worker self-management (e.g. Slovenia) 
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to private ownership, which might have distorted traditional concepts of corporate govern-
ance and, by this, the definition of a firm’s purpose.
This article has two main objectives. First, it provides an overview of some theoretical 
concepts on the issue of a firm’s purpose. We will follow two competing theories about the 
purpose of the modern firm; the shareholder and the stakeholder theories. We, however, 
acknowledge that in the management literature, a third approach also exists, one that empha-
sises delivering value to customers as the main purpose of the firm (Drucker, 1986, 1993a, 
1993b, 1995, 1999). Second, the article presents the results of an empirical study on firms’ 
purpose for Slovenia, a post-transition economy, which has over the last two decades gone 
through the process of establishing a full market economy. The main aim of the empirical 
study is to identify the firms’ purposes from the perception of Slovenia managers and 
establish if corporate purpose orientation depends on size, type and/or ownership structure. 
In a similar vein, Yoshimori (1995) examined the views of managers in Japan, Germany, 
France, the United States and the United Kingdom. He found that managers in Japan, 
Germany and France believe that the firm exists for the interests of all its stakeholders. On 
the other hand, most of the American and English managers argue that a firm should give 
first priority to shareholders’ interests. However, only few similar researches have been done 
in post-transitional countries where the transition from one to another type of ownership 
influenced the perception of the companies within the society (Biloslavo & Lynn, 2007).
The empirical part of the paper is based on a survey study. The survey questionnaire was 
pre-tested through interviewing five top managers in five Slovenian firms with different 
ownership structures (private, state, foreign and two mixed). The survey was then sent to 
the management of all Slovenian medium-sized and big companies (approximately 1400 
in total), of which about one third responded. As regards the results of the survey study, 
the perception of the firm’s purpose significantly differs among Slovenian firms according 
to the type of ownership. On the other hand, no significant differences were recorded 
among Slovenian firms according to their size and type. Nevertheless, on average, Slovenian 
managers put the interests of all stakeholders before the interests of only the shareholders.
This article continues with an overview of the theoretical framework and empirical stud-
ies, by which we focus on two baseline theories, i.e. shareholder and stakeholder theory, and 
with a discussion on management values in post-transition countries. After an extensive 
overview of literature, we continue with the methodology and presentation of empirical 
findings. In the final section we offer our conclusions.
2. Literature overview
In the literature we can find two basic lines of thought regarding firms’ purpose. The first 
perceives firms as economic entities, aimed at increasing shareholder value. The second per-
ceives firms as social institutions, aimed at promoting the interests of all firms’ stakeholders 
(i.e. shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, local and broader community).
The shareholder approach, which states that managers are required to manage a firm in 
the interests of its shareholders, has always been the ruling concept in the Anglo-American 
corporate governance. According to Easterbrook and Fischel (1996), the shareholders take 
the majority of the firm’s risk. Consequently, a firm has to be managed in accordance 
with their interests. Therefore, the shareholder value maximisation has to pursue two pur-
poses: responsibility and efficiency. This ensures that managers are fully accountable to 
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shareholders for their stewardship of the firm’s assets, making managers focused on a single 
clear objective, which ensures the most efficient outcomes (Gamble & Kelly, 2001).
With regard to the above interpretation, we may conclude that the shareholder theory 
raises no contradictions. However, this is not true in theory and even less in practice, mostly 
because of different cultural values that impact the institutional context and systems of 
corporate governance (Gamble & Kelly, 2001).
Goodpaster (1991) pointed on the obvious paradox of the stakeholder approach: manage-
ment has a contractual obligation to run the firm in the interest of shareholders and, at the 
same time, also a moral obligation to take into account the interests of all stakeholders (on 
this issue see also Boatright, 1994; Goodpaster & Holloran, 1994; Marens & Wicks, 1999).
2.1. Support for the shareholder theory
Several authors (Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram, & Walsh, 1999; Coffee, 1998; Hansmann & 
Kraakman, 2000; Höpner, 2001; Rubach & Sebora, 1998; Useem, 1999) support a share-
holder-oriented company purpose because they believe it can be a source of competitive 
advantage. In a more globalised world and increasingly competitive international capital 
markets they believe that firms with a shareholder-oriented purpose have access to cheaper 
capital sources, providing them with a competitive advantage over firms with a more stake-
holder-oriented purpose (Radosavljević, Anđelković, & Radosavljević, 2010). In a similar 
vein, Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) showed that firms with a shareholder-oriented 
purpose enjoy competitive advantages because they are more flexible and adaptive to mar-
ket changes. As these firms are not burdened with the interests of other stakeholders, they 
can adapt their management structures, enter the market more aggressively, and exit from 
inefficient investments more rapidly (Fiss & Zajac, 2004).
One of the strongest points of shareholder theory is that it offers a clear managerial 
objective that needs to be followed. Since a firm cannot maximise more than one strategic 
dimension at the same time, a single objective function is of utmost importance. Stakeholder 
theory, on the contrary, does not offer managers a clear managerial objective, as it does not 
explain how managers could choose between competing interests of stakeholders. If a man-
ager has to simultaneously maximise profits, market share, firm growth, salaries and other 
elements of stakeholders’ interests this will hinder his or her decisions and cause confusion. 
As a consequence, stakeholder theory increases agency costs and economic inefficiency and 
can be ideal for managers who will try to follow their own (short-term) interests. So firms 
that adopt stakeholder theory are limited in their competition for survival (Jensen, 2001).
According to Jensen (2001), the stakeholder theory, does not provide an answer to how 
to make a trade-off between different interests of all stakeholders and is harmful both for 
firm and for social welfare. This was confirmed also by empirical findings. Based on a case 
of small non-profit firms, Wruck, Jensen, and Barry (1991) showed the consequences of 
following more objectives at the same time. According to the authors, maximisation of 
several objectives at the same time almost destroyed the firm. Likewise, Cools and van 
Praag (2000), based on the analysis of 80 Dutch firms between 1993 and 1997, found that 
pursuing several objectives at the same time hinders firm’s competition. Jensen (2001) states 
that setting the value-creation score foremost in a firm could stimulate and not hinder its 
progress. Based on firms’ examples, he showed that many firms have gone bankrupt because 
they did not devote enough attention to the value creation/destruction score.
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Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) promoted shareholder value maximisation as a deci-
sion-making rule that brings benefits to all stakeholders. Their recommendation is as fol-
lows: ‘maximise the long-run value for shareholders and you will maximise the value of firms 
on the long run’. In this regard they presented an example of Merck, which was identified 
by Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar (2004) as a practical example of a successful stakeholders’ 
approach governed company. They specified the following rule of Merck: ‘Our ability to 
meet our responsibilities depends on maintaining a financial position that invites invest-
ment in leading-edge research and that makes possible effective delivery of research results’ 
(Merck, 2004). In other words, firms such as Merck need to achieve the required return 
for shareholders to fund investments that will in turn be beneficial for all its stakeholders 
(Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004).
2.2.  Support for the stakeholder theory
Senge (2000) presented an interesting definition of a firm as a living organism and not as 
a money making machine. As follows from history, nature itself makes a selection among 
organisms that have to pass a natural test of creating value. He believed that firms and eco-
nomic systems are like living organisms, yet their test of survival operates with a long time 
lag. Following this reasoning, Senge (2000) claimed that firms could also follow objectives 
other than only an increase of shareholder value.
In similar way, Freeman and Evan (1990) argued that the interests of other stakeholders 
can be highly associated with a firm’s performance as well, implying that they too can face 
losses. On the contrary, shareholders are more secured as they can (usually) sell their stocks 
on a liquid market. Thus, managers should not be more devoted or responsible to owners, 
especially not on the expense of other stakeholders (Freeman et al., 2004).
Wallace (2003) studied the issue of the long-term value for shareholders in the context 
of broader objectives of stakeholders. He found that long-term value creation is a neces-
sary condition for maintaining corporate investment in stakeholder relationships. Namely, 
firms with higher levels of shareholder value creation have a stronger reputation for treat-
ing stakeholders well. On the other hand, firms that create a small value for shareholders 
end up short-changing their shareholders and also all their constituencies. Wallace (2003) 
therefore claimed that investing in stakeholders can add value – an additional dollar spent 
on a relationship with stakeholders pays off as long as the present value of the expected 
(long-run) return is at least one dollar.
Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2009) developed a model of stakeholder capitalism. 
According to Allen et al., most of the literature deals with the question of whether firms are 
governed in accordance with the interests of shareholders. Nevertheless, in several countries 
firms do not focus only on the interests of shareholders, but also on other stakeholders. Using 
a simple model, Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2009) showed that a firm and (almost) all 
stakeholders are better-off if a firm concentrates on the interests of all stakeholders. Namely, 
their findings showed that in cases when firms also take into account the interests of other 
stakeholders (if this is not required by the law), this increases the firm’s value in comparison 
to firms focusing on shareholders alone. Some firms even consider the interests of other 
stakeholders if this is not directly associated with the value of a firm. However, this can 
result in increased prices of a firm’s goods and services, making consumers worse off. One 
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of the limitations of their study is that they treat shareholders, stakeholders and consumers 
as different groups, although in practice they overlap (Allen et al., 2009).
Hillman and Keim (2001) analysed a sample of 500 American S&P firms and found that 
investing in stakeholder management may be complementary to shareholder value creation 
and may provide a basis for competitive advantage, as it enables a firm to develop capabilities 
and resources that differentiate a firm from its competitors. As regards a firm’s participation 
in social issues, it may be understood as a transactional investment that can be easily copied 
by competitors.1 Hillman and Keim (2001) suggested that if the activity is directly tied to 
primary stakeholders, investments might not only bring benefits to stakeholders but also 
result in an increased shareholders’ value. Participating in social issues that go beyond the 
direct stakeholders’ interests, however, may have a negative impact on the firm’s ability to 
create shareholders’ value. In the decision-making process firms can rely on the reasoning 
of Moran and Ghoshal (1996), who claimed that things that are beneficial for society are not 
necessary bad for the firm, and what is good for the firm is not necessary a cost to society.
Koslowski (2000) showed that shareholder value can be used as a principle of man-
agement control, but not as the firm’s objective. According to the author, the idea that the 
shareholder value maximisation is the firm’s only objective is a mistaken legacy of a transfer 
from a financial to an industrial firm. Namely, concentration on the shareholder value works 
as means to increase the allocation efficiency of investments, which is a desired effect.
Among all stakeholders of a firm, an increase of firm’s value is an objective only for share-
holders. For other groups, this objective is just a precondition that enables the success of 
the firm as a whole. Following this, Koslowski (2000) suggested that the main purpose why 
a company has been established should be the production of goods and services, and not 
the production of profits or shareholder wealth. However, this may only be accomplished 
if adequate return on investments is realised. From this perspective, the creation of share-
holder value is only a precondition for achieving the main purpose of a firm; however, it is 
not the most important. Accomplishment of this condition enables a firm’s existence. The 
means of securing the purpose of the firm are, however, not the primary purpose of a firm.
3. Post-transition, management values and ownership
The theoretical claim that ownership matters and that the ownership structure has a strong 
influence on the behaviour of management was most visibly confirmed in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) during the transition and post-transition period to market-based 
democratic societies after 1989. Mass privatisation as one of the central tenets of the early 
period of transition continues to have an enormous influence on the behaviour of the man-
agers and on the prospects of firms in the post-privatisation period. This is the reason why 
the unique historical process of mass privatisation in CEE continues to draw the attention 
of academics, policy-makers, business groups and other groups of people interested in its 
socio-economic development.
The basic theoretical assumption behind mass privatisation was the claim that the CEE 
economies needed to establish ‘clearly defined property rights’ to create proper incentives 
for firms to start behaving efficiently. Regardless of how initial allocation of property rights 
would be established, the efficient markets would ensure that the property entitlements 
would be allocated to the most efficient property holders.
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The problem with this theoretical assumption was that it neglected other important legal, 
economic and regulatory institutions that provide proper incentives for active restructur-
ing and long-term competitiveness of firms. The crucial misunderstanding of the first and 
second generation of reformers in CEE was that they frequently mixed the goals and means 
of transition. In the area of transition, too many reformers viewed privatisation as a goal 
in itself, rather than as a mean to achieve goals, i.e., more competitive, more innovative 
and long-term competitive firms. This is one of the reasons why large-scale privatisation 
was conducted in haste, often without the proper regulatory and supervisory framework.
It has turned out, however, that the way the privatisation was conducted did matter. The 
initial design and ownership structure was also more important than previously thought. 
The regulatory and institutional framework, providing necessary incentives and support 
to conduct the demanding process of restructuring and improving competitiveness, also 
mattered. In the context of CEE, neither a thoughtful approach to the privatisation nor a 
comprehensive regulatory and supervisory framework existed.
According to the comprehensive empirical study by Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda, and 
Svejnar (2009), almost two decades after the implementation of mass privatisation, it is 
still not possible to clearly recognise that the privatised firms behave substantially more 
efficiently. It has to be added that the methodological issues relating to the studies of mass 
privatisation effects are truly immense. Nevertheless, according to the study of Estrin et al. 
(2009) on the effects of privatisation in transition economies, the finding was that:
Privatisation per se does not guarantee improved performance, at least in the short and medium 
run. Type of private ownership, corporate governance, access to know-how and markets, and 
the legal and institutional system matter for firm restructuring and performance. Foreign 
ownership tends to have a positive effect on performance. The positive effect of privatisation 
to domestic owners, to the extent it exists, takes a number of years to materialise. (Estrin  
et al., 2009)
The idea that the accountability of managers spans well beyond the responsibility to share-
holders is something that was well accepted in most of the advanced economies in the 
twentieth century. This idea may have been lost in the last few decades, but it may return 
soon. In the context of transition and post-transition, however, the broader idea of account-
ability of managers to other stakeholders, not only shareholders, carries with it another 
important but little-understood dimension. Namely, in the period of mass privatisation, 
the alliance of dominant shareholders, privileged and protected insiders, managers and 
interest groups turned out to be a major impediment for sustainable and successful long-
term development of firms.
To overcome this impasse, a broader alliance of shareholders, more balanced and diver-
sified, as well as an alliance with other stakeholders must be created. This transformation 
could be called a transition from privileged and protected rent-seekers toward a genuine 
development oriented society with balanced and well-articulated interests of both the share-
holders and stakeholders alike. Only then would the advanced and sophisticated debate on 
shareholders versus stakeholders make sense for the transition economies and societies.
4. Slovenia: the institutional context
Considerable cultural and economic differences exist within the post-transitional econo-
mies of the CEE. National institutions, the mode of economic transformation, the general 
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business environment and outside influences often influence corporate practice – including 
the use of mission statements – more than do the leaders, policies and cultures of individual 
firms (Hetrick, 2002; Korent, Đunđek, & Čalopa, 2014; Mesner-Andolšek & Štebe, 2005). 
During the economic transition of the 1990s, changes in management structures in the 
CEE were often modest or absent (Bojnec, 1999). Efficient and competitive firms continued 
to replace less efficient firms through 2000 (Bojnec & Xavier, 2004) and business cycles 
appeared to be following a relatively stable business cycle with a frequency of three to four 
years (Jagrič, 2003). Since Slovenia signed the accession to the European Union (EU) in 
2004, the period referred to as ‘the decade of transition’ can be deemed over. The post-transi-
tion period is creating new economic challenges with increased competitive and presumably 
isomorphic pressure for business strategies to mimic European and global competitors. 
Additionally, since the majority of successful Slovenian companies were diversified across 
unrelated industries during the period of economic transition, or experienced greater slack 
in their competitive environment, a clear mission seems to be of utmost importance, both 
in terms of product-market and corporate identity.
Of the seven CEE nations that joined the EU in 2004 – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – Slovenia was most closely positioned 
among CEE nations to EU competition and business practice.
In the context of the Slovene normative development, the first Companies Act was 
adopted in 1993. It was based on the German and Austrian tradition of companies’ legisla-
tion and has been amended comprehensively several times since its first adoption. In par-
ticular, the joint stock companies are strictly regulated according to the legal principle that 
the statutes of the companies cannot adopt any rule that is not envisaged by the legislation. 
The regulation of the small- and medium-size companies allows for a greater autonomy. The 
publicly traded joint stock companies, listed on the Ljubljana Stock Exchange, are subjected 
to additional requirements, including the provisions of the Corporate Governance Code.
Despite the comprehensive legislation and rapid regulatory development, it has not 
effectively prevented corporate mismanagement and corporate frauds in the years before 
the crisis. Subsequently, however, the judicial practice dealing with the civil and criminal 
liability of the responsible persons is also becoming stricter.
5. Methodology
In studying the perception of managers on their firm’s purpose, in Slovenia, we applied a 
survey study. Before applying a survey we pre-tested it by interviewing five top managers 
in five firms with different ownership structures (private, state, foreign and mixed). Based 
on findings of the pilot test, we revised the survey and eliminated possible uncertainties.
The survey was sent to the management of all Slovenian medium-sized and big firms 
(i.e., firms with 50 employees or more). The population comprised approximately 1400 
such firms, of which 399 firms responded. Due to a change in number of employees, 34 
firms were excluded from the sample (for these firms the number of employees fell below 
50 after we collected information about the firm), so the final sample comprised 365 firms. 
The survey included ten questions, of which three were referring to general information on 
the firm, while the rest were on managers’ perceptions on the firm’s purpose, their views 
on stakeholders, etc.2
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The answers were processed via descriptive statistics. Using correspondence analyses we 
tested correlations between the answers and firm’s size, type and ownership, respectively. 
In order to test for the statistical significance of correlations we employed the Pearson Chi 
Square parameter.
6. Empirical results
In this section we first provide an overview of the sample studied and also of the descriptive 
statistics for each of the survey questions. In the second part of the analysis, we explore 
whether managers’ perceptions of their firm’s purpose differ based on the firm’s ownership 
structure. We also examined whether the perception of the firm’s purpose differs with firm’s 
size and type, yet results were not statistically significant and therefore we do not discuss 
them in the continuation of this paper.
6.1. Overview of the sample
The sample included 365 firms, of which 25% were big and 75% medium-sized, which 
fairly corresponds to the population structure (see, for example, the survey study by Kosi, 
Nastav, & Dolenc, 2012). Only 1% of firms were mostly financial, while the rest of the sample 
comprised equally of manufacturing and service firms. From this perspective, the sample is 
almost representative. Namely, the population has slightly less than 60% of manufacturing 
firms, slightly less than 40% of service firms, and a small percentage of financial firms. As 
regards the ownership, most of the firms in the sample were mostly privately owned (60%), 
17% of firms were mostly foreign-owned, 10% were mostly family-owned and 13% were 
mostly state-owned. The population has about 22% of foreign-owned firms; however, for 
domestic firms the details on the ownership structure are not available.
6.2. Descriptive analysis of the survey
With our first question we tried to establish the managers’ general perception about their 
firm’s purposes and corporate governance model. The respondents had to choose from the 
5-level Likert scale. The results show that managers mostly take into account the interests 
of all stakeholders, not only owners, even though value maximisation in the long run and 
firm survival in the long-run are very important. As can be seen from Figure 1, managers 
strongly agree with both (rather similar) statements (b) and (e), implying that all stakehold-
ers (not only owners) are taken into account in decision-making and value maximisation 
of a firm. On the other hand, they, on average, disagree with statements (d) and (f) (and 
are indecisive on statement (g)), which emphasise the importance of shareholders only.
Figure 2 presents the ranking of stakeholders by their importance for running a business. 
On average, the managers ranked highest customers and owners, followed by employees. 
Interestingly, the authorities deserved the least attention; in addition, lenders are not high in 
the ranking. The rankings provided by the managers are in line with their answers presented 
in Figure 1, especially statements (b) and (e) – they, on average, rank owners in similar 
manner as other stakeholders.
At the moment the study was undertaken, not all managers took into account all possible 
stakeholders, we further asked them which stakeholders (that are currently not properly 
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considered) they would, if possible, also consider in the near future. As can be seen from 
Figure 3, the answers were rather similar to those of the previous question. Managers have 
a strong attitude to continuing to take into account the interests of customers, followed by 
employees and only then owners. The least consideration was given to government (the 
local and broader community moved higher up in the ranking) and lenders.
In parallel to that, we asked managers which stakeholders they could neglect easiest. The 
rankings are presented in Figure 4, by which those with a lower ranking could be neglected 
more easily than those with a higher ranking. As expected based on the previous two 
answers, the government’s interests could be neglected at first. Not consistent with the prior 
answers, though, is the rank of suppliers, which were high in the fifth rank. The interests of 
owners received the highest rank so their interests should be neglected last. Although the 
owners were the highest in the rank, the average value of their ranking is not significantly 
higher than the ranking value of customers and employees.
Figure 1. Firm’s purposes and corporate governance model. source: authors’ research and calculations.
Figure 2. Ranking of stakeholders (current). source: authors’ research and calculations.
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In one of the questions we asked managers why – in their own belief – they should take 
into account also the interests of other stakeholders (not only those of owners). Respondents 
could choose more answers (see Figure 5). As expected, one answer received a significantly 
higher number of ticks. Managers take into account the interests of other stakeholders 
because they believe that this brings value added to their firm – almost 70% of managers 
chose (at least) this reason. This is in line with their strong agreement with statements (b) 
and (e) presented in Figure 1.
Figure 4. Ranking of stakeholders according to which interests could be neglected easiest. source: authors’ 
research and calculations.
note: 1 – neglect at easiest, 8 – neglect at hardest.
Figure 3. Ranking of stakeholders (future). source: authors’ research and calculations.
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In the continuation of the study we selected several claims and asked managers if they 
agree with them or not (see Figure 6). Managers most evidently agreed with the statement 
that their governance model is efficient (70% ticked ‘yes’). Surprisingly, a high percentage 
of managers could not decide on first the three claims, although those who decided on ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’, chose ‘no’ more often. Managers more or less do not take decisions which they (!) 
believe will have negative long-run consequences despite the positive short-run effect and 
they would not want to take business decisions with the awareness that they bring long-run 
negative effects even though they are beneficial to stakeholders other than for owners. And 
finally, as already noted in previous answers, managers also take into account the interests 
of other stakeholders when managing the firm and taking strategic decisions.
In the final question we asked managers what tend to be the important factors for the long-
run success of a firm. The first two options were offered in the survey, and managers could 
also write and assess other options (these answers were then gathered in generic groups). It 
Figure 5. Reasons for taking other stakeholders’ interests into account. source: authors’ research and 
calculations.
Figure 6. managers’ decisions on selected claims. source: authors’ research and calculations.
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seems that these answers do not have a significant value added to our research as respondents 
listed all sorts of answers and factors of which all tend to be important or very important. 
However, we could see that, according to managers, the long-run success of a firm could 
be achieved when different stakeholders are satisfied with firm performance (see Figure 7).
To summarise, managers’ responses to different survey questions are rather similar. 
Based on this overview we could conclude that the majority of Slovenian managers adopt 
a stakeholder approach as, besides the shareholders’ interests, they follow the interests of 
0 1 2 3 4 5
d) At decision making we take into account only the interests of owners
(return on capital, share price).
g) In our firm we take into account only interests of owners, 
                                      important is only the value of a firm.
f) In our firm we take into account mainly the interests od owners,
important is only profit. (**)
b) Our main objective is value maximization for all stakeholders
(owners, employees, suppliers,…)
e) At decision making we take into account also interests of others
(owners, employees, suppliers,…)
a) Our main objective is value maximization of a firm in a long-run.
(**)
c) Our main objective is the survival of a firm on a long run. (***)
Mean
Mostly State Mostly Private Mostly Foreign Mostly Family
Figure 8. Firm’s purposes and corporate governance model for different ownership structure. source: 
authors’ research and calculations.
note: statistical significance: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
Figure 7. important factors for long-run success of a firm. source: authors’ research and calculations.
830   I. STUBELJ ET AL.
other stakeholders. This result is in line with similar research made by Figelj and Biloslavo 
(2008) on a smaller sample of medium and large Slovenian processing companies.
6.3. Relationship between purposes of firms and ownership structure
In the final part of the analysis we tested the relationships between ownership structure and 
selected questions. The aim was to investigate whether management in firms with different 
ownership structures (i.e., different majority shareholders) have different views on corporate 
governance and firm purposes.
First, we took a look at the answers to the questions presented in Figure 1 above. As 
can be seen from Figure 8, the perception of managers significantly differs by ownership 
structure in three statements (i.e., statements (a), (c) and (f)). As regards statement (f) (‘In 
our firm we mainly take into account the interests of owners, only profit is important’), 
it is obvious that the management in firms with foreign and family owners consider, on 
average, the interests of owners and through that pursue profit more than management in 
other firms. Nevertheless, for all of ownership types the average level of an answer is well 
below 3, so, in general, firms’ managements still mostly disagree with this statement. For 
statement (a) (‘Our main objective is value maximisation of a firm in the long-run’) it seems 










Mostly State Mostly Private Mostly Foreign Mostly Family
Figure 9. Ranking of stakeholders (current) for different ownership structure. source: authors’ research 
and calculations.
note: statistical significance: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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that value maximisation is the least important for management in state-owned firms and 
is (interestingly) most important for management in family-owned firms. From statement 
‘c’ (‘Our main objective is the survival of a firm in the long-run’) we can conclude that sur-
vival of a firm is the main preoccupation of management in family- and state-owned firms.
With regard to the ranking of stakeholders (see Figure 9), there are significant differences 
in different ownership structures for almost all of the listed stakeholders. Owners, for exam-
ple, are considered to be more important for management in foreign- and family-owned 
firms and less for management in state- and privately-owned ones. And, obviously and as 
expected, in state-owned firms the interests of the local and broader community, environ-
ment and government itself is evidently emphasised.
Some differences are also evident in the ranking of stakeholders whose interests could be 
neglected (see Figure 10). Managers of foreign- and family-owned firms strongly emphasise 
that owners should not be neglected, and similarly for customers and employees. However, 
these managers believe that they could most easily neglect the interests of the local and 
broader communities and the interests of government. This is less true for managers of 
privately-owned firms and does not hold for managers of state-owned firms.
We also tested differences in answers for other survey questions but have found no sig-
nificant differences in relation to ownership structure.










Mostly State Mostly Private Mostly Foreign Mostly Family
Figure 10. Ranking of stakeholders according to which interests could be neglected for different ownership 
structures. source: authors’ research and calculations.
note: statistical significance: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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7. Conclusion
This article attempts to provide an answer to a much-debated issue of firms’ purposes, 
with special attention being paid to a post-transition economy, Slovenia. In this regard, we 
followed two main objectives. First, we aimed to look the theoretical views on the question 
of a firm’s purpose, in relation to its governance model. We found two mainstream theories 
related to the purpose of a firm: (i) the shareholder theory, which supports the value maxi-
misation for shareholders; and (ii) the stakeholder theory, according to which a firm should 
follow, as well as the shareholders’ interests, the interests of other stakeholders.
After examining the theoretical perspectives on firms’ purposes, we aimed to study the 
problem in Slovenia. In this regard we used a survey study, which helped us understand 
the thinking and acting of Slovenian managers. Owing to objective reasons we limited 
our research to medium-sized and large firms and carried out a vast survey analysis (after 
pre-testing it via interviews). The feedback was satisfactory enough to have a confidence 
in the results and conclusions of the research.
Two main messages of the empirical research could be underlined. First, on average, 
Slovenian firms put the interests of all stakeholders before the interests of only shareholders. 
This is evident from different questions and combinations of answers. It therefore seems that 
the majority of managers follow the stakeholder approach in the governance model. This is 
in a way also logical for at least two reasons. Slovenia is a part of the Continental-European 
business area, implying that it follows a similar governance approach. And second, due to 
the specific development of firms and their ownership structure after the transition to a 
market economy and privatisation, in many of the firms (claimed as privately-owned) the 
ownership structure changed from being concentrated to diffused (in many of the firms 
employees are part-owners), so the interests of ‘owners’ are not so emphasised. This can be 
backed with the findings of corresponding analysis. Indirect support to our findings can 
also be found in the research, conducted by Figelj and Biloslavo (2008). They studied which, 
according to managers and experts, internal and external actors are the most influential 
in the Slovenian food industry. The study showed that managers perceive consumers to be 
the most influential actors, followed by owners, whereas experts believe that employees are 
the most influential.
As for the second main message, the perception of a firm’s purpose significantly differs 
among Slovenian firms according to the type of ownership. Even more, the answers of 
managers from foreign- and family-owned firms are, in several cases, similar; however, 
they are different from the answers of managers of state- and privately-owned firms. It 
therefore seems that firms where the owner is obvious (i.e., in foreign- and family-owned 
firms) could more easily identify themselves with the idea of shareholder theory than other 
firms. However, even in these firms, the ideas of stakeholder theory prevail. In this context, 
an additional dimension to the discussion between shareholder versus stakeholder theory 
could be added. Namely, the dividing line between the privileged and protected insiders 
versus excluded outsiders, as the outcome of mass privatisation during the period of tran-
sition, should be observed. This dividing line, which influences the behaviour of managers 
and firms in the post-transition period, would require additional theoretical and empirical 
research.
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The article has important value added, as it tries to provide an answer to one of the basic 
questions of corporate governance theory, i.e., what is the purpose of a firm, both from a 
theoretical and an empirical point of view. Especially important are the empirical findings, 
as not many empirical studies have been done so far in this field, at least not for post-tran-
sitional economies and, to our knowledge, none for Slovenia. The empirical research raises 
interesting questions for research in other post-transition economies.
Notes
1.  Organisations and their stakeholders are becoming aware of the need for and the benefits of 
socially responsible behaviour. An organisation's performance in relation to society and to its 
impact on the environment has become a critical part of measuring its overall performance 
and its ability to continue operating effectively (Peterlin, Dimovski, Uhan, & Penger, 2011).
2.  The survey is available from the authors.
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